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Faithfully Enforcing the Religious Liberty
Guarantees of the Northwest Territory States
Allan W. Vestal*
fK == f kqolar`qflk =
In 2001, the State of Wisconsin hired a new chaplain for its maximum-security prison.1 The appointment was controversial because
the new chaplain, the Reverend Jamyi Witch, was a Wiccan priestess.2
The chair of the General Assembly’s Corrections and Courts
Committee, future Wisconsin Governor and Republican presidential
aspirant Scott Walker, objected to the appointment of a Wiccan
chaplain.3 One of his primary objections was based on his belief that
Wicca is an “offensive” religion: “Witch’s hiring raises both personal
and political concerns. Not only does she practice a different religion
than most of the inmates, she practices a religion that actually offends
people of many other faiths, including Christians, Muslims and
Jews.”4
The leadership of the Wisconsin corrections system defended the
appointment.5 As the system’s spokesperson observed: “Times have
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. I would like to thank my research assistants
Josh Duden, and Kyle Henry for their work on this piece, Mark Zaiger for his insightful comments on early drafts, and Law School Professor of Law Librarianship Rebecca Lutkenhaus for
her creative assistance.
1. Doug Newhoff, Wiccan Named Witch is New Chaplain of Wisconsin Prison,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 9, 2001), https://wcfcourier.com/b-wiccan-named-witch-isnew-chaplain-of-wisconsin-prison/article_c85229cd-90e4-57bb-a930-e74e74dcda41.html.
2. Id.
3. Assemblyman Walker threatened an investigation: “I can't imagine that most of the
inmates would feel particularly comfortable going to that individual . . . I would think, in some
ways from a religious standpoint, it might actually put inmates in a position that talking to (a
Wiccan) is contrary to what some of their own religious beliefs might be.” Josh Israel, Meet the
‘Wiccan Witch’ Who Took on Scott Walker, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://thinkprogress.org/meet-the-wiccan-witch-who-took-on-scott-walker-e31240236b39/.
4. Id.
5. Gary McCaughtry, the warden of the maximum-security prison to which Reverend
Witch was appointed, defended the selection: “Basically, a lot of it has to do with the duties and
character of the individual, and Jamyi is an outstandingly approachable person—somebody that
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changed. It’s not just Catholic and Protestant anymore.”6 In the end,
perhaps unintentionally following the Wiccan precept “an it harm
none, do what ye will,”7 the controversy subsided.8 Reverend Witch
assumed her pastoral duties at the prison and served for a dozen
years, although her tenure was not without controversy.9
Curiously, for one who advocated firing a state-employee prison
chaplain based on her “offensive” religious beliefs, Assemblyman
Walker cast himself as a champion of religious freedom: “I believe
protecting religious freedom is inherent in our state constitution,” he
declared, “Heck, it’s inherent in our U.S. Constitution.”10
But of course, religious liberty is not merely “inherent” in the
Wisconsin Constitution. As Assemblyman Walker might have
learned by reading the document, firing Reverend Witch because of
her Wiccan beliefs would arguably have violated at least three guarantees of the Wisconsin Constitution’s Declaration of Rights. Section 18 guarantees “[t]he right of every person to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed.”11 It also guarantees, “nor shall . . . any preference be given
by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.”12 As to
the employment of Reverend Witch as a state-employee prison chapI wouldn't mind approaching on spiritual matters myself. If biases are present, it's a matter for
us to work through those biases.” Newhoff, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Translated as “as long as it doesn't hurt anybody, do whatever you want,” the Wiccan Rede has been described as the only real rule in Wicca. Lisa Chamberlain, Core Wiccan
Beliefs: The Wiccan Rede, WICCA LIVING, http://wiccaliving.com/wiccan-rede/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2020).
8. Assemblyman Walker's witch hunt did not bear fruit: “Walker was unsuccessful in
getting Witch removed from the position—his planned legislation never materialized and he
left the legislature in early 2002.” Israel, supra note 3.
9. In 2011, Reverend Witch was involved in what has been termed “a bizarre faux hostage scheme that involved allegations of sex with a prisoner behind a barricaded office door.”Joe
Watson, Sex Assault Charges against Wiccan Ex-Prison Chaplain Dismissed, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/sep/25/sex-assaultcharges-against-wiccan-ex-prison-chaplain-dismissed/. She was charged criminally, but the
charges were eventually dropped. Id. Reverend Witch was dismissed from state employment in
2013 based in part on an allegation that she supplied opioids to the prisoner in the faux hostage
situation. Witch v. Dep’t of Corr., Dec. No. 33855-A (Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, March
30, 2015), http://werc.wi.gov/personnel_appeals/werc_2003_on/pa33855-A.pdf. She grieved
the dismissal, but her claim was dismissed. Id.
10. Walker’s ‘God’ Flip Flop, FITZWALKERSTAN (Apr. 6, 2015), https://fitzwalkerstan.
wordpress.com/tag/rev-jamyi-witch/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
11. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
12. Id.
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lain, Section 19 provides “[n]o religious tests shall ever be required as
a qualification for any office of public trust under the state.”13
Had Assemblyman Walker read the Wisconsin Constitution, he
might have made another discovery, one that would have given him
legitimate grounds for opposing the appointment of the Wiccan prison chaplain. For Wisconsin’s Constitution, like the constitutions of
many states, contains religious liberty guarantees which are violated
by the practice of having state-employee prison chaplains. Thus, although Reverend Witch’s hiring was not controversial at the time because of her status as a state employee (she became one of thirty-six
chaplains employed by the Wisconsin corrections system),14 it should
have been.
Three provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution Declaration of
Rights are potentially violated by the use of state funds to hire prison
chaplains. The first is the compulsion guarantee, which forbids the
use of state funds to support religious ministries. Wisconsin’s compulsion guarantee provides: “[N]or shall any person be compelled to
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, without consent.”15
The second provision potentially violated by having stateemployee prison chaplains is the preference guarantee, which forbids
the state from discrimination in the treatment of religions. Wisconsin’s preference guarantee provides: “[N]or shall . . . any preference
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.”16
The third provision violated by state-employee prison chaplains
is the Blaine amendment, which forbids the use of state funds to benefit religions. Wisconsin’s Blaine Amendment provides: “[N]or shall
any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”17
Wisconsin is not alone in this conflict between state constitutional religious liberty guarantees and the practice of having stateemployee prison chaplains. The Badger State was formed out of the
Northwest Territory and shares a religious liberty heritage with the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at art. I, § 19.
Newhoff, supra note 1.
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
Id.
Id.
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eight other states—Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Ohio, and South Dakota—that were similarly created.18 Eight of the nine Northwest Territory states have compulsion
guarantees,19 seven have preference guarantees,20 and seven have
Blaine amendments.21 And all but one of the Northwest Territory
states have state-employee prison chaplains.22
And, although this discussion focuses on the nine Northwest
Territory states, the contradiction between state constitution religious liberty clauses and the practice of having state-employee prison
chaplains is not limited to those states. Across the nation, the norm is
to have state-employee prison chaplains. A 2012 study indicated that
over 80% of prison chaplains are directly employed by states, while
an additional 8% are employed by states as contractors.23 At the same
time, a substantial number of the forty-one non-Northwest-Territory
states have religious liberty provisions that could ground a challenge
to the practice of having state-employee chaplains. Nineteen of the
forty-one states have compulsion clauses in their current constitutions.24 Twenty-one of the forty-one states have preference clauses in
their current constitutions.25 Twenty-five of the forty-one states have
18. Allan W. Vestal, “No person . . . Shall ever be Molested on Account of his Mode of
Worship or Religious Sentiments . . . .”: The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Strader v.

Graham, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1087 (2019).
19. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I., § 16; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 3; and WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
20. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; and WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 18.
21. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art. XIII, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3;
and WIS. CONST. art. I, §18.
22. See infra notes 70-78.
23. Religion in Prisons - A 50-State Survey of Prison Chaplains; Profile of State Prison
Chaplains, PEW RES. CTR. (March 22, 2012), www.pewforum.org/2012/03/22/prisonchaplains-profile/ (“About eight-in-ten report that they are employed directly by a state correctional system (81%). Other arrangements include working as a contractor (8%), working for a
private prison management firm (5%) or working through a religious organization (5%).”).
24. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 7; KY. CONST.
BILL OF RIGHTS, § 5; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 36; MO. CONST. art. I, §
6; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. III, § 11; PA. CONST. art.
I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST.
ch. I, art. 3; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; and W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 15.
25. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO.
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Blaine amendments in their current constitutions.26 I focus on the
nine Northwest Territory states simply to illustrate the larger situation.
The following discussion first traces how—and why—the religious liberty guarantees of the Northwest Territory states differ from
the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. Next, the discussion turns to the compulsion guarantees of the Northwest Territory states. I argue that these provisions are incompatible with having
state-employee prison chaplains. I then turn to the preference guarantees of the Northwest Territory states. I argue that these provisions as well are incompatible with having state-employee prison
chaplains. The discussion then briefly looks at the Blaine amendments. Whether these provisions are incompatible with having stateemployee prison chaplains depends on the precise wording of the
provisions. I then review the single case from the courts of the
Northwest Territory states addressing whether the practice of having
state-employee prison chaplains can be reconciled with the religious
liberty guarantees of the applicable state constitutions. The discussion then turns to the one Northwest Territory state, South Dakota,
which provides prison pastoral services without violating its religious
liberty provisions. I conclude with several observations as to what is
really at issue in this situation, and a suggestion as to how the courts
could faithfully interpret these state constitution religious liberty
guarantees.

CONST. art. II, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; KAN. CONST. BILL OF
RIGHTS, § 7; KY. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. 3,
§ 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 6; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; and WYO. CONST.
art. I, § 18.
26. Some twenty-five non-Northwest Territory states have Blaine amendments, although the number is approximate and subject to classification differences. Toby J. Heytens,
Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 123 n.32 (2000). ALASKA
CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8; COLO. CONST. art.
V, § 34, art. IX, 7; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2,
para. VII; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; KY. CONST. § 189; MASS.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (as amended by Article XLVI of the Amendments, November 6, 1917);
MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2d, art. 83; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 15, 29; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; UTAH CONST. arts. I, § 4, X, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; and
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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Although the Northwest Territory was created under the Articles
of Confederation by passage of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,27
the nine Northwest Territory states were admitted to the Union following ratification of the Federal Constitution.28 In writing the religious liberty provisions of their state constitutions, one might have
expected the drafters to model the religious liberty provisions of
those state constitutions on the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”29 But
they did not. While all nine Northwest Territory states included a
free-exercise guarantee in their initial constitutions,30 only one—
Iowa—copied the establishment guarantee, and then with a significant addition.31
The reason the Northwest Territory states did not follow the establishment formulation of the First Amendment is understandable.
When the citizens assembled to write the initial constitutions of the
Northwest Territory states, the religious landscape of the nation was
very different than it had been at the time the Establishment Clause
was drafted. And it was different in ways that made the establishment
of a single state church inconceivable.
27. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, reprinted in 1 U.S.C.
at LV (2006), https://perma.cc/QFU9-6Q5G.
28. The ninth state to ratify the Constitution was New Hampshire on June 21, 1788.
The first Northwest Territory state to be admitted to the Union was Ohio in 1803. An Act to
Enable the People of the Eastern Division of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio to
form a Constitution and State Government, and for the Admission of Such into the Union, on
Equal Footing with the Original States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 40, 1802 Stat. 173. An
omission in the original congressional action was corrected 150 years later. Joint Resolution for
Admitting the State of Ohio into the Union, Pub. L. 83-204, 67 Stat. 407 (1953).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 3; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 3; IOWA CONST.
of 1844, art. II, § 3; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16;
N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CONST. of 1889,
art. VI, § 3; and WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 18.
31. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 3 (“The general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any person
be compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any minister or ministry.”).
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When the Northwest Territory states were drafting their initial
constitutions—from Ohio in 1803 to the Dakotas in 1889—the nation was in a period of great religious change. The United States was
in the Second Great Awakening, the Protestant religious revival
which began in 1790 and lasted for the next sixty years.32 The movement represented a romantic counter to the rationalism of the Age of
Reason and saw a dramatic increase in church attendance—especially
among denominations that had not been the beneficiaries of establishment under the old regime—and an explosion in the number of
religious sects.33 Religion was no longer narrow and hierarchical: it
had become individual and democratic.34 Charles Eliot Norton, editor of the North American Review explained,
The relation between God and the soul is original for every man.
His religion must be his own. No two men think of God alike. No
man or men can tell me what I must think of him. If I am pure of
heart, I see him, and know him;—& creeds are but fictions that
have nothing to do with the truth.35

As a result of the Second Great Awakening, religion in the United States became voluntary and democratic. If every American could
speak with God and know his or her own religious truth, if each person’s understanding was as valid as every other person’s, then there
was no basis upon which any civil authority could legitimately discriminate among them. Nor could any civil authority legitimately
force a citizen to participate in, or give support to, any religious program. This democratization of religion was a sea change from just a
few years before.

32. Allan W. Vestal, “In the Name of Heaven, Don't Force Men to Hear Prayers”: Religious Liberty and the Constitutions of Iowa, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 355, 371-77 (2018).
33. Id. at 374.
34. Id. at 372-75.
35. JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF
AMERICA 133 (1985) (quoting Charles Eliot Norton, “editor of the nation's most respected
magazine, the North American Review,” as he “spelled out his basic principle of belief for a
Midwestern minister” in 1865).
IN
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A pamphleteer wrote at the time of the trial of Abner Kneeland, the
last man imprisoned in the United States for blasphemy, describing
the spirit of his contemporaries:
[T]he public . . . are a new race of young people, ardent, generous,
liberal, moral people; and though we would not say that a majority
of them are indifferent to the truths of the christian religion, or unbelievers in its dogmas, we do state it as our decided opinion, that a
vast majority are disposed to have perfect freedom of thought and
of discussion . . . [W]hen coercion and the power of the law, are
called in support or to spread opinions, then will be seen the rising
up of the liberal spirit of the age. This is the prevalent, existing feeling . . . .36

The voluntary and democratic character of religion in the United
States was reflected in an evolution in the status of religious denominations. Early in the period when the Northwest Territory states
were writing their constitutions and being admitted to the Union, the
disestablishment of state religions was completed.
By the time the first Northwest Territory state was admitted to
the Union—Ohio in 1803—only three of the original thirteen colonies had an official state church. Pennsylvania and Rhode Island never had established state churches.37 Eight of the remaining eleven
original colonies disestablished by the time of Ohio’s entry into the
Union—Delaware (1776), New Jersey (1776), North Carolina (1776),
New York (1777), Virginia (1776-1779), Maryland (1785), South
Carolina (1790), and Georgia (1798).38
The next Northwest Territory states admitted were Indiana in
1816,39 and Illinois in 1818.40 By 1819, Connecticut and New Hamp-

36. A COSMOPOLITE,
FOR BLASPHEMY 31 (1835).

A REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AGAINST ABNER KNEELAND

37. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1457 (2004) (“Pennsylvania and Rhode

Island can be put to one side as never having had establishments.”).
38. Id. at 1457-1458.
39. An Act to Enable the People of Indiana Territory to Form a Constitution and State
Government, and for the Admission of Such State into the Union on an Equal Footing with the
Original States, ch. 57, 1816 Stat. 289.
40. An Act to Enable the People of Illinois Territory to Form a Constitution and State
Government, and for the Admission of Such State into the Union on an Equal Footing with the
Original States, ch. 67, 1818 Stat. 428.
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shire had disestablished,41 leaving only Massachusetts with some form
of established religion among the original thirteen states. In Massachusetts, establishment lingered in a greatly weakened form that John
Adams described as a “mild and equitable establishment of religion,”42 until all vestiges of establishment were finally ended just as
the next Northwest Territory state, Michigan, was admitted.43
As de Tocqueville wrote in 1835, the separation of church and
state was complete. The disestablishment of American churches had
been accomplished and the establishment issue was dead:
I found that all of these men differed among themselves only on the
details, but all attributed the peaceful dominion that religion exercises in their country principally to the complete separation of
Church and State. I am not afraid to assert that, during my visit in
America, I did not meet a single man, priest or layman, who did not
agree on this point.44
41.

Connecticut disestablished in 1818; New Hampshire the following year. Esbeck,

supra note 37, at 1458. Not among the original thirteen colonies, Vermont disestablished in
1807. Id. Kentucky and Tennessee preceded Ohio into the Union, in 1792 and 1796 respective-

ly. Both states entered the Union with constitutions which precluded establishment. KY.
CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § III (“That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of right be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against
his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies
or modes of worship.”), and TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, §3 (“That all men have a natural
and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences' that no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship
or to maintain any ministry against his consent, that no human authority can in any case whatever Control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by Law to any religious Establishments or modes of worship.”).
42. John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion” John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE 213, 215 n.6
(1999). A COSMOPOLITE, supra note 36, at 19 (tracing history of disestablishment in Massachusetts); DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848 (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 164-165; and SEAN WILENTZ, THE
RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN (W.W. Norton & Company,
2005), at 188 ([A]fter 1815 “the [Massachusetts] reformers made their greatest gains in proposing expanded religious liberties, recommending an end to the existing religious test for officeholders and equalization of the distribution of local tax monies to Unitarians and Congregationalists.”).
43. An Act to Establish the Northern Boundary Line of the State of Ohio, and to Provide for the Admission of the State of Michigan into the Union upon the Conditions Therein
Expressed, ch. 99, 1836 Stat. 49.
44. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: IN TWO VOLUMES 480
(Eduardo Nolla, ed., 2012).
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Thus, when the remaining Northwest Territory states were admitted—Iowa in 1846,45 Wisconsin in 1848,46 Minnesota in 1858,47
and the Dakotas in 188948—it was simply not within the contemplation of state constitution drafters that a state might establish an official church.
The drafters of the initial constitutions of the Northwest Territory states drafted new types of provisions to address the religious liberty problems their new state governments might realistically encounter. Might the state use public funds to support religious activities—
not of a single established state church, but of any church or churches? Might the state treat some churches differently than others—not
in the sense of establishing a single state church, but rather by treating some churches more favorably than others?
The drafters developed nuanced clauses in response to the situation in which they found themselves in the nineteenth century. Initially, they adopted two types of post-establishment religious liberty
guarantees. Compulsion guarantees protected against citizens being
compelled to participate in or support religious activities through
taxes or otherwise. Preference guarantees protected against the state
favoring one religion over another. Later, in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, many states adopted a third type of state constitutional religious provision, the Blaine Amendments. These provisions grew out of anti-Catholic bias and were an attempt to preclude
the use of state funds to support Catholic schools.49
The compulsion and preference guarantees are not coextensive. A
state action might violate the compulsion guarantee but not the preference guarantee. For example, a state could give $1,000,000 out of
the state treasury to every religious sect or denomination. Such an ac45. An Act for the Admission of the State of Iowa into the Union, ch. 1, 1846 Stat. 117.
46. An Act for the Admission of the State of Wisconsin into the Union, ch. 50, 1848
Stat. 233.
47. An Act for the Admission of the State of Minnesota into the Union, ch. 31, 1858
Stat. 285.
48. An Act to Provide for the Division of Dakota into two States and to Enable the
People of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to Form Constitutions and
State Governments and to be Admitted into the Union on an Equal Footing with the Original
States, and to Make Donations of Public Lands to Such States, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, (1889).
49. Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 558-65
(2003).
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tion would violate the compulsion guarantee by using public funds to
support ministries but would not violate the preference guarantee because the state gave money to all religious groups without preference.
Or, a state action might violate the preference guarantee but not the
compulsion guarantee. A state could enact a law declaring the Southern Baptist Convention to be the official church of the state. Such an
action, without more, would not violate the compulsion guarantee
because it would not require the expenditure of any state funds. It
would violate the preference guarantee by giving a preference to Baptists over Catholics, Muslims, Presbyterians, Wiccans, Satanists, and
all the rest. Or, a state action might violate both the compulsion
guarantee and also the preference guarantee. For example, if a state
provided a subsidy for Catholic schools but not for Muslim schools it
would violate both religious liberty guarantees.
Eight of the nine Northwest Territory states—all but North Dakota—have compulsion guarantees in their state constitutions.50 Seven of the nine—all but Iowa and Michigan—have preference guarantees.51 Six of the Northwest Territory states—Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin—have both.52
We look first at the compulsion guarantees, to see if having stateemployee prison chaplains is permissible under these provisions.

fffK == ` ljmripflk= d r^o^kqbbp=^ka= p q^qb J bjmilvbb=
m ofplk= ` e^mi^fkp =
The nine Northwest Territory states drafted their initial constitutions between 1803 and 1889. Four of the states—Minnesota,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin—are still governed by
their original constitutions. The nine states have adopted a total of
eighteen constitutions, the most recent being the Illinois constitution
of 1970. All the Northwest Territory states but North Dakota have

50. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §
3; and WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
51. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; and WIS. CONST. art. I,
§18.
52. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; and WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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and always have had compulsion guarantees. Their provisions are
remarkably uniform.
Illinois has had four constitutions; compulsion guarantees are
found in all of them.53 The current provision is, “[n]o person shall be
required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against
his consent.”54
Indiana has had two constitutions; compulsion guarantees are
found in both.55 The current provision is, “no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.”56
Iowa has had two constitutions; compulsion guarantees are found
in both.57 The current provision is, “nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates
for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any
minister, or ministry.”58
Michigan has had four constitutions; compulsion guarantees are
found in all of them.59 The current provision is, “No person shall be
compelled to attend, or, against his consent, to contribute to the
erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes,
taxes or other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or
teacher of religion.”60
Minnesota has had one constitution; it contains a compulsion
guarantee: “[N]or shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent.”61

53. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art.
XIII, § 3; and ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 3. The first listed constitution, adopted in 1970,
remains in effect.
54. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
55. IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; and IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 3. The first listed constitution, adopted in 1851, remains in effect.
56. IND. CONST. art. I, § 4.
57. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 3. The first listed constitution, adopted in 1857, remains in effect.
58. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3.
59. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. II, § 3; MICH. CONST. of
1850, art. IV, § 39; and MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 4. The first listed constitution, adopted
in 1963, remains in effect.
60. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4.
61. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16. Minnesota's constitution was adopted in 1857.
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Ohio has had two constitutions; compulsion guarantees are found
in both.62 The current provision is, “No person shall be compelled to
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form
of worship, against his consent.”63
South Dakota has had one constitution; it contains a compulsion
guarantee: “No person shall be compelled to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship against his consent.”64
Wisconsin has had one constitution; it contains a compulsion
guarantee: “[N]or shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without
consent.”65
Under all of these compulsion guarantees, citizens are promised
that they will not be compelled66 to support67 any ministry or minister68 without the citizen’s consent.69 All but one of the nine Northwest Territory states have state-employee prison chaplains: Illinois,70
Indiana,71 Iowa,72 Michigan,73 Minnesota,74 North Dakota,75 Ohio,76
62. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3. The first listed constitution, adopted in 1851, remains in effect.
63. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that compelling
an Ohio taxpayer to support a minister or ministry would violate the compulsion guarantee
protection against that taxpayer being “compelled to . . . support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent.” Id.
64. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3. South Dakota's constitution was adopted in 1889.
65. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18. Wisconsin's constitution was adopted in 1848.
66. In place of “compelled,” Illinois substitutes “required.” ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
67. In place of “support,” Iowa substitutes “pay tithes, taxes, or other rates” for maintaining. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3.
68. In place of “support any minister,” Ohio substitutes “support any place of worship,
or maintain any form of worship.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
69. Iowa does not include the possibility of consent. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3.
70. ILL. DEP’T OF CENT. MGMT. SERVS., Class Specification, Chaplain I, https://
www2.illinois.gov/sites/work/Documents/pdfs_specs/06901.pdf.
71. IND. ST. PERS. DEP’T, Job Code Listing, https://www.in.gov/spd/files/
job_titles.pdf.
72. IOWA DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., HUMAN RES. ENTERPRISE, 03310, CHAPLAIN
(2009), https://das.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/hr/documents/class_and_pay/JobClassDescriptions/Chaplain-03310.pdf.
73. MICH. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, Job Specification, Institution Chaplain, https://www.
michigan.gov/documents/InstitutionChaplain_12737_7.pdf.
74. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., Religious Programming, (2018), http://www.doc.state.
mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=302.300.htm (“Each facility has a
trained and qualified facility chaplain available to oversee the reasonable delivery of religious
services to all faith traditions.”); MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., Minnesota Chaplain Position Description (redacted copy supplied by the Minnesota Department of Corrections on file with the
author).
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and Wisconsin.77 Among the Northwest Territory states, only South
Dakota does not.78 The citizens of eight of the nine states are compelled to pay taxes which are used to pay the salaries of stateemployee prison chaplains. If prison chaplains are ministers, the
practice of having state-employee prison chaplains violates the compulsion guarantees of these states.79 In the remainder of this section, I
argue that prison chaplains are ministers.

A. Prison Chaplains Are Ministers Because of How Their Job is Defined
What did the drafters of these constitutions mean when they used
the term “minister”? One indication is the definition of the term in a
contemporaneous dictionary. The 1828 dictionary by Noah Webster
defines “minister” as: “One who serves at the altar; one who performs
sacerdotal duties; the pastor of a church, duly authorized or licensed
to preach the gospel and administer the sacraments.”80 Ministers,
then, are individuals who perform sacred81 or liturgical duties who are
75. N.D. HUMAN RES. MGMT. SERVS., Class Description: Chaplain, https://www.
nd.gov/omb/sites/omb/files/documents/state-employee/job-openings-comp/job-classdescriptions/4171.pdf.
76. OHIO DIV. OF HUMAN RES., Chaplain, https://das.ohio.gov/Divisions/HumanResources/HRDClassSpec.
77. WIS. DEP’T OF CORR., Classification Title, Chaplain, https://wisc.jobs/public/print
_view.asp?jobid=93354&annoid=93840
78. South Dakota provides pastoral services to prison inmates by relying on volunteers.
See infra § VII (text accompanying footnotes 142 to 156).
79. It should be noted that all eight of the compulsion clauses are stated in the disjunctive: it violates the constitution to compel a citizen to support either a place of worship or a
ministry. Thus, it is enough to prove a violation of the compulsion clauses that prison chaplains
are ministers; one need not prove that the prisons themselves are places of worship (although
one ought not concede the point). ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (“[S]upport any ministry or place of
worship . . .”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“[S]upport . . . any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry . . .”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3. (“[P]ay . . . taxes . . . for building . . . places of worship,
or the maintenance of any minister . . .”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4. (“[S]upport of any place of
religious worship, or to pay . . . taxes . . . for the support of any minister . . .”); MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 16. (“[S]upport any place of worship, or to maintain any religious . . . ministry . . .”);
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7. (“[S]upport any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship . . .”); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3. (“[S]upport any ministry or place of worship . . .”); and;
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18. (“[S]upport any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry . . .”).
80. Minister, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see
also, Ministry, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828). Sacerdotal,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (“Pertaining to priests or
the priesthood; priestly . . . .”).
81. Sacred, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (“Holy;
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in some way endorsed by a religious group. That prison chaplains are
ministers is confirmed by looking at what they do, how they describe
themselves, and how they are selected.

B. Prison Chaplains Are Ministers Because of What They Do
That prison chaplains are ministers is confirmed by looking at
what they do.
As their duties are described in state regulations, prison chaplains
officiate at religious ceremonies, administer religious sacraments, and
engage in pastoral counselling. Given those duties, they are ministers
by any reasonable definition of the term.
For example, the official Illinois job description for the stateemployee prison chaplain position, a “Chaplain I” in that state's nomenclature, is representative of the group.82 As to the distinguishing
features of the work, the regulations provide:
Under general direction, conducts a program of religious activity
at a state institution; counsels with patients, inmates, employees,
families and other individuals; coordinates religious program with
and participates or cooperates in clinical and rehabilitative programs at a state institution; interprets institutional programs, purposes and problems to the public by addressing interested groups;
works and cooperates with representatives of faiths interested in
ministering to members of their faith within the institution; conducts educational ministry for the instruction and training of others.83

pertaining to God or to his worship; separated from common secular uses and consecrated to
God and his service . . . . Relating to religion or the worship of God; used for religious purposes . . . .”).
82. DEP’T OF CENT. MGMT. SERVS., supra note 70.
83. Id. at 1.
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As “illustrative examples” of the chaplain's work, the regulations
provide that the chaplain, among other activities:
Conducts religious services for patients, inmates, residents and employees; administers sacraments and other religious rites; conducts
funerals and offers religious instruction. Counsels and advises inmates and patients on spiritual matters. Maintains individual religious records and prepares reports on inmates' and patients' progress . . . . [P]rocures choir and other religious music. Works and
cooperates with representatives of other faiths who conduct a religious ministry at the institution . . . .84

Thus, in Illinois, state-employee chaplains conduct religious activities, conduct religious services, administer sacraments and religious rites, offer religious instruction, and counsel and advise on spiritual matters. In other words, they are ministers. The activities of
state-employee chaplains in the other seven Northwest Territory
states that have state-employee prison chaplains are consistent with
the Illinois model.
Indiana defines “chaplain” as “[a]n endorsed religious professional employed by the Department of Correction to provide for the delivery of spiritual care and the management of a facility religious services program.”85
Iowa's administrative rules stipulate that a chaplain “[p]rovides
professional pastoral care to institutional residents through counseling and conducting worship services; performs related work as required.” Under the rules, a chaplain “[p]lans and conducts religious
worship services and administers religious rites” and “[p]lans and
provides for religious education,” among other tasks.87
Michigan's administrative rules read that a state-employee chaplain “[p]rovides and coordinates pastoral care by bringing the resources of religion and spiritual strength to people dealing with
meaning and values in living, unresolved grief, guilt and remorse, loss
Id. at 1-2.
IND. DEP’T OF CORR., 01-03-101, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: THE
DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY OF RELIGIOUS SERVICES 2 (2018), https://www.in.gov/idoc/
files/01-03-101%20Religious%20Services%201-1-2018.pdf.
86. IOWA DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., supra note 72.
87. Id.
84.
85.
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of will to live, personal worth and hopelessness, etc,” “[p]lans and
conducts religious services, including funerals, marriages, and any
other services unique to the faith, where appropriate,” “[p]rovides
emergency pastoral care at times of serious illness, death or disaster,”
and “[m]onitors and coordinates religious education for residents,”
among other duties.88
In Minnesota, the chaplain “must have a religious commitment,”
and “is responsible to the Corrections Program Director and ecclesiastical officials.”89 The Minnesota chaplain “responds to the spiritual/religious needs of offenders” in that he or she “coordinates and
provides religious services,” and provides “pastoral care and counseling.”90
In North Dakota prison chaplains “provide pastoral care and
counseling,” “[c]onduct worship services,” and “[c]ounsel and/or advise residents concerning spiritual matters.”91
The Ohio rule provides that: “[t]he purpose of the chaplain occupation is to provide worship services & religious education programs
for inmates, consumers & residents of institutions.” In addition to
other tasks, in Ohio the state-employee chaplain: “[c]onducts worship
services, sacramental observations & religious educational programs
for consumers, inmates or residents of institutions (e.g., mental
health, corrections), [and] plans & organizes sermons, bible studies &
other chaplaincy programs.”93
In Wisconsin, a Department of Corrections chaplain “develops
and directs institution religious/spiritual programs including Christian and non-Christian denominations. Provides religious worship
services directly or through monitoring volunteer or contracted services of community-based religious leaders. Develops and implements religious counseling programs for the inmates.”94
88.
89.
90.
91.

MICH. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, supra note 73.
MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 74.

Id.

N.D. HUMAN RES. MGMT. SERVS., supra note 75; see also, N.D. DEP’T OF CORR.
& REHAB., INMATE HANDBOOK 55 (2013), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/Documents/North%20Dakota%20-%20Inmate%20Handbook.pdf (Chaplains provide “religious services to the inmate population,” “provide spiritual teachings and lectures,”
and make “religious studies, spiritual books, papers, and magazines” available to inmates.).
92. Id.
93. OHIO DIV. OF HUMAN RES., supra note 76.
94. WIS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 77.
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Given the pastoral duties they are assigned, prison chaplains are
ministers by any reasonable definition of the term.

C. Prison Chaplains are Ministers Because of How They Describe
Themselves.
That prison chaplains are ministers is also confirmed by how they
describe themselves. According to the American Correctional Chaplains Association (the “ACCA”), “correctional chaplains provide pastoral care to those who are disconnected from the general community
by certain circumstances—in this case to those who are imprisoned . .
. .”95 The ACCA specifies that “[e]ach correctional chaplain is . . . a
representative of his or her faith community” and that “[c]haplains
perform Liturgical Duties for their own religious denominations.”96
“Pastoral Counseling” is one of the “specific duties of correctional
chaplains” identified by the group.

D. Prison Chaplains are Ministers Because of How They are
Selected.
That prison chaplains are ministers is also forcefully confirmed
by how they are selected. To be appointed as a state-employee prison
chaplain, an individual has to be authorized, approved, or endorsed
by a religious sect. Illinois, for example, “[r]equires ordination or licensing by a recognized communion and [that the applicant] is duly
authorized by appropriate authority of this denomination.”98All eight
of the Northwest Territory states which have state-employee chaplains have such an endorsement requirement.99 The ACCA provides
95. What Are Correctional Chaplains?, AM. CORR. CHAPLAINS ASS’N,
https://www.correctionalchaplains.org/what_is_the_acca.htm#WHAT (last visited Jan. 30,
2019).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. DEP’T OF CENT. MGMT. SERVS., supra note 70, at 2.
99. The Illinois Administrative Code defines the position of chaplain in the Department
of Corrections to be “an individual who is commissioned, licensed, ordained, or endorsed as
required by the individual's religious faith and with whom the facility has employed or contracted to conduct religious activities within a correctional facility.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,
§ 425.12 (1996), http://www.ilga.gov/commission/jcar/admincode/020/020004250000120R
.html. The Indiana Department of Correction rules provide that “[t]he Staff Chaplain shall
maintain the endorsement of his/her religious body as a condition for continuing employment
as a Chaplain.” IND. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 85, at 7. The Iowa administrative rules pro-
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that each chaplain “is required to be endorsed by their denominational body in order to qualify as a chaplain.”100 In its Code of Ethics,
the group explains the relationship between the prison chaplain and
his or her faith group:
Chaplains are those members who are ordained or have parallel
designation, or otherwise vocationally identified, for correctional
chaplaincy by their religious judicatory or its designated endorsing
body representing the faith group. Chaplains are thus authorized
for religious ministry within jails or prisons as designated representatives of the faith group.101

Consistent with the statement that prison chaplains are engaged
in a “religious ministry,” the prison chaplain group repeatedly refers
to the tasks of its members in terms of them engaging in “ministry.”102 In other words, the way in which prison chaplains describe
vide that “candidates for Chaplain positions must provide the appointing authority with
demonstrated evidence (ecclesiastical endorsement or comparable verification) that the candidate is authorized by proper authority to perform ministerial functions within h/his religious
denomination.” IOWA DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., supra note 72. The Michigan rule requires
that chaplains possess “[c]ertification or endorsement by the recognized endorsing body of the
religious faith,” and further provides that “[c]ertain positions may require that only individuals
with credentials in a particular religious faith be considered.” MICH. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N,
supra note 73. The Minnesota rule requires that “[t]he Chaplain (Religious Coordinator) must
have an endorsement by an established religious community.” MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra
note 74. The North Dakota rule “[r]equires ordination, commissioning, licensing, or endorsement by a recognized religious community.” N.D. HUMAN RES. MGMT. SERVS., supra note 75.
The Ohio rule requires a “[c]urrent ecclesiastical endorsement by denomination &/or ordination . . . .” OHIO DIV. OF HUMAN RES., supra note 76. Wisconsin also requires an endorsement
by a religious body in the form of “[d]ocumentation or a letter of endorsement . . . from an authority representing a faith community . . . [which confirms a prospective chaplain's] affiliation
with the religious organization.” WIS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 77.
100. AM. CORR. CHAPLAINS ASS’N, supra note 95.
101. Id. at Code of Ethics: Principle V.
102. Id. at What are Correctional Chaplains? (“[W]e also minister to the families of prisoners.”); id. at Code of Ethics (“ministry to all prisoners and staff” and “[s]uch ministry and
outreach”); id. at Code of Ethics: Principle I (“All members are spiritual leaders . . . who participate in ministry to the incarcerated.”); id. at Code of Ethics: Principle II (“All members practice their ministry task as pastoral care providers through various religious activities” and “religious ministry in a correctional setting.”); id. at Code of Ethics: Principle V (“Chaplains are
thus authorized for religious ministry within jails or prisons . . . .”); id. at Code of Ethics: Principle VII (“Members are responsible for effective ministry,” “[m]embers exercise their ministry,” “[m]embers conduct their ministry,” and “[c]haplains balance administrative duties with
direct ministry . . . .”); id. at Code of Ethics: Principle VIII (“[M]ight discredit their ministry”
and “responsible for ministry to prisoners regardless of religious beliefs or affiliation.”). The
group also refers to its members as “clergy.” Id. at Specific Duties of Correctional Chaplains
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their own activities confirms that state-employee prison chaplains are
ministers.
Requiring that state-employee prison chaplains have an ongoing
affiliation with and endorsement from a religious sect is distinguishable from, for example, an educational qualification that prison chaplains have an undergraduate degree in religion or theology. The endorsement requirement means the applicant has a continuing
relationship with the religious sect. In other words, the endorsement
requirement confirms that state-employee prison chaplains are ministers and that for their states to pay their salaries subsidizes the religious sects with which they are affiliated.
State-employee prison chaplains are ministers: they are part of
the particular religious sect with which they are affiliated. Having
state-employee prison chaplains violates the compulsion guarantees
of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. We turn now to an evaluation of whether having state-employee
prison chaplains violates the preference guarantees of the various
states.

fsK == m obcbobk`b= d r^o^kqbbp=^ka= p q^qb J bjmilvbb=
m ofplk= ` e^mi^fkp =
The second type of religious liberty provision adopted by states
entering the Union after the establishment threat passed guaranteed
against the state favoring one religion over another. These are the
“preference provisions,” an example of which is another Wisconsin
clause: “[N]or shall . . . any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship . . . .”103 Seven of the nine
Northwest Territory states—all but Iowa and Michigan—have preference clauses in their current constitutions.104

(“advising other clergy”); id. at Code of Ethics: III (“clergy or those with parallel designation”).
103. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848).
104. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No preference shall be given, by
law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship . . . .”); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“nor
shall . . . any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship”);
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this state . . . .”); OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 7 (“no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society”); S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or
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Having state-employee chaplains puts the states in the precarious
position of choosing which religious sects should be favored with the
subsidy of having its ministers employed by the state. The practice
raises the possibility that states will categorically exclude certain religious sects from participation in the subsidy system. For example,
when Wisconsin hired its first Wiccan prison chaplain, the warden of
the prison defended the appointment.105 But at the same time, the
warden declared that there are limits on the faiths that could be represented in the ranks of state-employee chaplains: “Satanists” he declared, “. . . wouldn't be allowed to serve.”106 One might imagine that
a Satanist inmate, knowing that she has the same free-exercise rights
as her Episcopalian cellmate, might think that she should also have
equivalent access to state-subsidized pastoral care.
Even if state officials do not as a matter of policy exclude disfavored sects from participating in the subsidy, it is inevitable that the
state will not allocate resources to provide state-employee prison
chaplains for every sect represented in the prison population. Those
that are represented will be preferred over those that are not.
There is an expectation that a state-employee prison chaplain
provide pastoral services for inmates from religions other than that
with which he or she is affiliated. As Reverend Jamyi Witch, the Wisconsin Wiccan prison chaplain, described it: “My job is to help them
connect with the divine however they see the divine.”107 But it must
be acknowledged that having a minister of one's own denomination
conduct a religious service has to be more fulfilling than having the
same service conducted by a minister of a different denomination.
For example, having a Satanist chaplain conduct a service for a
Southern Baptist inmate cannot be as fulfilling for the inmate as having the same service conducted by a Baptist minister. And having a
Catholic priest conduct a Jewish service cannot be as meaningful for
the Jewish inmate as having the same service conducted by a rabbi.

mode of worship”); and WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“nor shall . . . any preference be given by law
to any religious establishments or modes of worship”).
105. Newhoff, supra note 1.
106. Id. The warden additionally said that “members of some violent cults, especially
those associated with hate groups” also would not be allowed to serve as state-employee prison
chaplains. Presumably, ministers from truly violent cults could be excluded from service based
on concerns regarding institutional security.
107. Israel, supra note 3.
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Even if a Catholic priest can go through the motions of leading a
Hindu prayer, it evidences an impermissible preference by the state if
Hindu inmates do not have a minister of their faith provided by the
state while Catholic inmates do. Indeed, having state-employee prison chaplains representing some, but not all, religions is potentially an
impermissible state preference in three ways. First, the inmate follower of a disfavored religion suffers from an impermissible preference when the state denies her a state-employee minister of her faith
while providing one for her cellmate who is a follower of a favored
religion. Second, the minister of a disfavored religion suffers from an
impermissible preference when she is denied state employment as a
prison chaplain because of her religious beliefs while the minister of a
favored religion is hired. Third, the disfavored religious sect suffers
from an impermissible preference when it is denied a state subsidy
while the favored religious sect is infused with state funds.

sK == qeb= _i^fkb= ^ jbkajbkqp=^ka= p q^qb J bjmilvbb=
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The third way in which having state-employee prison chaplains
may violate the constitutions of the Northwest Territory states arises
from the Blaine amendments, state constitution provisions adopted
starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century designed to prevent the funding of Catholic schools.108
Seven of the nine Northwest Territory states—all but Iowa and
Ohio—adopted Blaine amendments and retain them in their current
constitutions.109 Whether the practice of having state-employee prison chaplains violates the various Blaine amendments depends on the
exact wording of the state constitution provisions.
Consistent with the objective of the Blaine amendments, three
states frame their constitutional provisions in terms of aid to religious
institutions or schools. Indiana provides that funds may not be ex-

108. DeForrest, supra note 49, at 558-65.
109. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (see also, ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1870)); IND. CONST.
art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (see also, MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1908); MICH.
CONST. art. IV, § 40 (1850); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1835)); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; id.
art. XIII, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; and WIS. CONST. art. I, §
18.
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pended “for the benefit of any religious or theological institution”110;
Michigan guarantees against the use of public funds “directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private denominational . . . school”;111
and North Dakota prohibits the use of public funds “for the support
of any sectarian school.”112 Although the pastoral duties of prison
chaplains are sometimes cast to include religious education,113 these
Blaine amendments would not seem a compelling basis upon which
to base a challenge to state-employee prison chaplains.
Minnesota has a parallel provision relating to the use of public
funds to support religious schools,114 but it also has a provision which
forbids the use of public funds "for the benefit of any religious societies."115 Similar broad-form Blaine amendment language is found in
the constitutions of Illinois, which guarantees that the General Assembly shall not “make any appropriation or pay from any public
fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose,”116
South Dakota, which guarantees against the use of public funds “for
the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution,”117 and

110. IND. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.”).
111. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“No public monies or property shall be appropriated
or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or
agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other
nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary school.”).
112. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (“No money raised for the support of the public schools
of the state shall be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school.”).
113. Illinois provides that a prison chaplain “conducts educational ministry for the instruction and training of others.” DEP’T OF CENT. MGMT. SERVS., supra note 70, at 1. Iowa
provides that a chaplain “[p]lans and provides for religious education.” IOWA DEP’T OF ADMIN.
SERVS., supra note 72; Michigan stipulates that a chaplain “[m]onitors and coordinates religious
education for residents.” MICH. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, supra note 73; Ohio provides that chaplains “provide worship services & religious education programs for inmates, consumers & residents of institutions.” OHIO DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., supra note 76.
114. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (“In no case shall any public money or property be
appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular Christian or other religious sect are promulgated or taught.”).
115. Id. at art. I, § 16 (“[N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit
of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.”).
116. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“Neither the General Assembly nor any county . . . shall
ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any
church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian
denomination whatever . . . .”).
117. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“No money or property of the state shall be given or appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution.”).
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Wisconsin, which guarantees against the use of public funds “for the
benefit of religious societies.”118
A credible additional challenge to the practice of providing stateemployee prison chaplains could be based upon the Blaine amendment language in the constitutions of Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.119
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It seems perfectly clear that state-employee prison chaplains are
ministers, and that the payment of their salaries by their respective
states inures to the benefit of their particular religious sects. If this is
true, then the practice of having state-employee prison chaplains violates the compulsion guarantees of the seven Northwest Territory
states that have such chaplains and such religious liberty guarantees.
Six of the Northwest Territory states have preference guarantees
and state-employee prison chaplains. In states where some religious
sects have been excluded from participation in the prison chaplain
subsidy, there are clear violations of the preference guarantee. Even
in states which have avoided such categorical exclusions, the fact that
some but not all religious sects have state-employee prison chaplains
violates the preference guarantees.
In the three Northwest Territory states where the language of
the Blaine Amendment covers having state-employee prison chaplains, the practice apparently violates the state constitution.
Given the straightforward constitutional prohibitions and the
clear religious identity of the prison chaplains as ministers, it is perhaps curious that the issue has been litigated only once in the courts
of the Northwest Territory states. The Supreme Court of Iowa faced
the issue directly in 1976. It simply got the matter wrong.
In the 1976 case Rudd v. Ray, the Iowa Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding Iowa’s compulsion guarantee, it is permissible for
the State of Iowa to use public funds to provide dedicated chapels and

118. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“[N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for
the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”).
119. The South Dakota Blaine Amendment would permit a credible challenge if the state
had state-employee prison chaplains.
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state-employee chaplains in the state’s prisons.120 In coming to this
conclusion, the Rudd majority conflated the compulsion guarantee
with the provision of the Iowa Constitution which tracks the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution: “The general assembly
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”121
The Rudd majority observed:
Like similar provisions included in the constitution of all sister
states Art. I., §3 has a common origin and parallel history with the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. All such provisions were aimed at disestablishment of state churches or, in cases
of later western states such as Iowa, at preventing the establishment
of state churches.122

The Rudd majority did concede that the language of the Iowa
Constitution is different than that of the Federal Constitution in that
Iowa includes both language that tracks the Establishment Clause
and the compulsion guarantee. But, the majority asserted, the difference in language did not suggest that the framers of the state constitution intended anything other than a guarantee against a state
church:
To the extent our provision differs from the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution we think our framers were merely
addressing the evils incident to the state church. The framers addressed and provided a defense against the evils incident to a state
church, forced taxation to support the same, and the payment of
ministers from taxation.123

The Rudd majority conflated the compulsion guarantee and the
Establishment Clause, ignoring the plain meaning of the former and
the unambiguous history of the latter. There are two historical
threads that are helpful in understanding the error of the Rudd majority. One relates to the history of state constitution religious liberty
120.
121.
122.
123.

Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Iowa, 1976).
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3.
Rudd, 248 N.W.2d at 130.
Id. at 132.
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adoptions between 1789 and the drafting of the Iowa compulsion
provision in 1844. The other relates to the history of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence during the same period.
First, the Rudd majority was grossly misleading in its presentation of the history of state constitutional adoptions of provisions paralleling the Federal Establishment Clause. The majority speaks of
“provisions . . . aimed at disestablishment of state churches or, in the
cases of later western states such as Iowa, at preventing the establishment of state churches.”124 “[S]imilar provisions,” the Rudd majority asserts, were included in the constitution of all the “sister
states.”125 This is simply not true.
Following adoption of the First Amendment, fifteen states were
admitted to the Union prior to Iowa in 1846. Fourteen of those fifteen states adopted free-exercise provisions modelled on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.126 In contrast, only one—
Alabama in 1819—tracked the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.127 Consistent with the analysis that establishment had
been superseded by issues of compulsion and preference, eleven of
the fifteen states admitted between 1789 and 1846 had compulsion
provisions,128 and eleven had preference provisions.129
Following the admission of Iowa to the Union in 1846, the admission of the next fifteen states extended to Wyoming in 1890. All

124. Id. at 130.
125. Id.
126. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. 2, § 3; FLA.
CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 3; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, §
3; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § III; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 3; MINN. CONST. of 1857,
art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 3; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 4; OHIO
CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3; TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art.
11, § 3; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 4; and VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. I, art. 3.
127. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7 ("There shall be no establishment of religion by
law.").
128. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. 2, § 3; ILL. CONST.
of 1818, art. VIII, § 3; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 3; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § III;
MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. of
1802, art. VIII, § 3; TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 3;
TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 4; and VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. I, art. 3.
129. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 3; FLA.
CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 3; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, §
3; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § III; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. of 1817,
art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3; TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 3; TENN.
CONST. of 1796, art. 11, § 3; and TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 4.
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fifteen of those states adopted free-exercise provisions.130 Not one of
the fifteen tracked the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
But nine of the fifteen had compulsion provisions131 and thirteen had
preference provisions.132
The admission of the last six states following Wyoming in 1890
presents a somewhat different picture. Following the earlier states,
five of the six states—all but Arizona—adopted free-exercise provisions.133 In a change from prior practice, three of the six tracked the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.134 All three are understandable. Because of its unique history with the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, Utah in 1895 was presumably seen by
some as presenting a realistic establishment threat. Admitted in 1959,
Alaska and Hawaii became states after the Establishment Clause jurisprudence ceased to be dormant. Among the final six states admitted to the Union only one—New Mexico—had either a compulsion
provision or a preference provision, and it had both.135
Thus, far from the Rudd majority's claim that establishment
clauses were included in the constitutions of all the sister states, only
four states included an establishment clause as such in their initial
constitutions.
130. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 4; IDAHO
CONST. of 1890, art. I, § 4; KAN. CONST. of 1861, Bill of Rights, § 7; MINN. CONST. of 1857,
art. I, § 16; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 4; NEV. CONST. OF 1864, art. I, § 4; NEB.
CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 4; N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 3; OR. CONST. of 1859, art. I, §§ 2,
3; S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 3; WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. of
1863, art. I, § 9; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 18; and WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 18.
131. See COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 4; IDAHO CONST. of 1890, art. I, § 4; KAN.
CONST. of 1861, Bill of Rights, § 7; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16; MONT. CONST. of
1889, art. III, § 4; NEB. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 4; S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 3; W. VA.
CONST. of 1863, art. I, § 9; and WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 18.
132. See; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 4; IDAHO
CONST. of 1890, art. I, § 4; KAN. CONST. of 1861, Bill of Rights, § 7; MINN. CONST. of 1857,
art. I, § 16; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 4; NEB. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 4; NEV.
CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 4; N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 3;
W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. I, § 9; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 18; and WYO. CONST. of
1889, art. I, § 18.
133. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4 (1959); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1959); N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 11 (1911); OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1907); and UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4
(1895).
134. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4 (1959) (“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1959) (“No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion.”); and UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4 (1895) (“The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”).
135. See N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13.
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Second, the Rudd majority suggests that in 1844 establishment
was a significant enough issue to warrant not only inclusion of the
language of the Federal Establishment Clause, but also the inclusion
of an entirely new provision, the compulsion guarantee, intended as a
redundant defense against establishment. This hardly seems likely, as
the establishment of a state religion had ceased to be a realistic prospect in the United States some two generations before the Iowa
Constitution of 1844 was written. Or, in the alternative, is it possible
that the inclusion in 1844 of language tracking the Establishment
Clause was merely intended to tap into a rich body of then-existing
Supreme Court case law which used establishment nomenclature to
address much broader questions of religious liberty? Well, no, because no such body of Supreme Court case law existed at the time.
Between the adoption of the First Amendment and the 1844 Iowa
constitutional convention, the United States Supreme Court did not
issue a single opinion construing the Establishment Clause. Indeed,
the first United States Supreme Court case interpreting the Establishment Clause in any depth would not be decided for more than a
century after the Iowa constitution was adopted: Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township, decided in 1947, which incorporated
the Establishment Clause as to the states.136
Rudd was in error because the majority opinion was based upon a
fundamental misreading of American religious and political history.
The Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution and the compulsion clause of the Iowa Constitution mean very different things
because they were drafted in response to very different situations. To
treat the compulsion guarantee as mere restatement of the Establishment Clause is to ignore important currents of American history.
The error of the Rudd majority was particularly egregious because the Iowa Supreme Court had correctly interpreted that state’s
compulsion guarantee six decades earlier, in the 1918 Iowa Supreme
Court case of Knowlton v. Baumhover.137 In that case, Chief Justice
Silas Weaver, writing for the court, correctly and succinctly explained
the meaning of Iowa’s state constitution compulsion guarantee by
noting three things the religious liberty clauses of the Iowa constitution forbids: “In this state the Constitution (article 1, § 3) forbids the
136.
137.
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establishment by law of any religion or interference with the free exercise thereof and all taxation for ecclesiastical support.”138
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How might a state provide pastoral services in state prisons without violating its compulsion clause, preference clause, or Blaine
amendment? South Dakota models how this can be done.
South Dakota has nine state correction facilities, housing around
four thousand inmates.139 It is a racially and ethnically diverse prison
population,140 in which seven major faith groups are represented: Asatru, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Native American Spirituality, and Wicca.141
South Dakota makes religious resources available to inmates
without having any state-employee prison chaplains. Instead, the
state relies on volunteers working with the coordination of a stateemployee who is not a minister, is not required to be endorsed by a
religious body, and does not perform pastoral functions.142 The state
subsumes religious activities within the category of “cultural activi138. Id. at 207.
139. Adult Corrections, S. D. DEP’T OF CORR. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://doc.sd.gov/doc
uments/AdultPopulationDecember2019.pdf. South Dakota’s correction facilities are primarily
located in the more populous eastern portion of the state. The penitentiary for men and its annex are located in Sioux Falls; the prison for men is located in nearby Springfield. The prison
for women is located in Pierre, in the center of the state. Work centers are located in Yankton
and Sioux Falls in the east, Pierre in the center, and Rapid City in the west.
140. Inmates by Race/Ethnicity, S. D. DEP’T OF CORR. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://doc.sd.
gov/documents/InmatesbyRaceEthnicityDecember312019.pdf. The Department of Corrections lists seven racial and ethnic categories among the corrections population: White (52.8%),
Native American (34.9%), African American (7.5%), Hispanic (3.7%), Asian (<1%), Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Isl. (<1%), and other (<1%). See id.
141. Adult Corrections: Cultural Activities, S. D. DEP’T OF CORR. https://doc.sd.gov/
adult/cultural.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). (defining Asatru as “[b]elief in the ancient Norse
(Norway) gods – gods of the Vikings”).
142. S. D. DEP’T OF CORR., Cultural Affairs Coordinator, Job ID: 22461,
https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/cultural-affairs-coordinator-at-state-of-south-dakota1102984548. The position announcement states: “The Cultural Affairs Coordinator manages
all cultural and religious programming provided to inmates at the Prison.” Id. The listed duties
are: coordinating the activities and functions of all religious and cultural volunteers; coordinates
the scheduling and logistics of activities and functions; represents assigned areas at staff meetings; monitors and prepares reports of operation activities as required; develops, revises and
enforces relevant policies and procedures; [and] facilities specific inmate programming.
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ties”: “The [South Dakota Department of Corrections] recognizes
the importance of cultural activities in the lives of those committed to
our care. We offer opportunities for inmates to participate in both
spiritual ceremonies and cultural activities . . . .”143
Access to religious resources is coordinated in each Department
of Corrections facility by a state employee, the Cultural Affairs Coordinator, who “supervises volunteers involved in the various religious . . . programs.”144 Volunteers are divided into two categories. A
Pink Tag Religious Volunteer is “[a] person who provides worship
and instruction, pastoral care and administration of religious activities.”145 An Orange Tag Religious Volunteer is “[a] person who assists
the Religious Volunteer.”146 The training required of Pink Tag Religious Volunteers is more rigorous than that of the Orange Tag Religious Volunteers.147 Both classes are said to represent their faith
group, but none of the volunteers are required to be ordained.148
Religious activities are conducted “under the auspices of the institution's Cultural Activities Coordinator. . . .”149 For example, inmates
seeking spiritual counseling send a request to the Cultural Affairs
Coordinator, who promptly lets the appropriate religious volunteer
know of the request and works with the volunteer to make any required special arrangements.150 The Cultural Affairs Coordinator also
arranges for religious functions within the institution.151 The administrative rules provide that “each approved group will receive compa143. Adult Corrections: Cultural Activities, supra note 141.
144. Policy 1.5.F.4 Inmate Religious and Cultural Activities, S.D. DEP'T OF CORR. at III
(April 8, 2019), https://doc.sd.gov/documents/Inmate%20Religious%20and%20Cultural%
20Activities5302019.pdf (The applicable administrative rule defines the Cultural Activities Coordinator (CAC) position: “The designee appointed by the Warden to ensure coordination of
all religious and cultural functions (activities and programming) offered to inmates. The position supervises volunteers involved in the various religious or cultural activities or program.
Each institution shall have one staff member who is responsible to perform the duties of a
CAC.”)
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Pink Tag Religious Volunteers are required to complete a training program and
attend annual in-service training. Orange Tag Religious Volunteers need only have “completed
requirements specified within the DOC Volunteer Handbook.”
148. Id. (The two groups “may or may not include persons who are ordained by the faith
group they represent.”).
149. Id.
150. Id. at IV.2.
151. Id. at IV.3.
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rable time and space for programming, including one weekly worship
opportunity and opportunities to observe religious/cultural holidays/days of significance, as approved . . . .”152
Inmates in work release programs may be permitted to attend approved religious activities in the community.153 To do so, the inmate
submits a “Community Activity Attendance Application” to the facility’s Cultural Activities Coordinator, who reviews the requested activity and either approves or rejects the application.154 There are limits
on such community religious activities in terms of location, frequency, and duration.155 The rules provide that “[a]s a tool to strengthen
the re-entry process . . . [a]uthorized inmates may be provided the
opportunity to attend approved religious and/or cultural activities
and/or events in the community.”156
Volunteers from the religious faith communities are actively involved at South Dakota’s correctional facilities. For example, Chaplain Jan Voelzke was cited for her work as a volunteer:
Each Thursday, Voelzke leads a worship service at Mike Durfee
State Prison for the Full Gospel Church, an inmate congregation
that she founded eight years ago and serves as pastor. She also holds
a worship service at the South Dakota Women’s Prison once a
month, teaches six different classes for inmates throughout the week
and provides Christmas Sacks for inmates at the Yankton Trusty
Unit. Voelzke is also the chair of the chaplain advisory board that
encourages communication between religious volunteers and the
Department of Corrections.157

152. Id. at IV.6.
153. Id. at IV.6.G.
154. Id. at IV.2.A. (stating that the “[r]eview shall include verifying the validity of the
activity, location, time, length and level of supervision provided”).
155. Id. at IV.2.B., C. Without a waiver, the activities are to be within 25 miles, no longer than three hours, and not more frequently than once a week.
156. Policy 1.5.F.3 Inmate Community Religious Activity Guidelines, S.D. DEP’T OF
CORR. at II (February 18, 2020), https://doc.sd.gov/documents/about/policies/Inmate%
20Community%20Religious%20Activity%20Guidelines.pdf.
157. Volunteer, Staff Members Awarded by DOC, YANKTON DAILY PRESS &
DAKOTAN, (June 21, 2004), https://www.yankton.net/archive/article_c814bb06-ca97-5e658bb0-f8f8c0b9c3fe.html.
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At the same time as Chaplain Voelzke was honored, the Department of Corrections honored an additional group of volunteers: Pastor Michelle Bradley of the Church of Hope,158 Father Bernie Ashfield of the Catholic Church,159 Pastor Dave Christensen of the Saint
Dysmas Church,160 Chaplain Regan Beauchamp of the Prison Lighthouse Fellowship,161 and Mary Montoya, a Native American spiritual
volunteer.162
Faith communities in South Dakota have organized to provide
religious resources to the inmate population. St. Dysmas, an Evangelical Lutheran Church in America congregation, was organized to
serve the population of the men’s facilities in Sioux Falls and Springfield.163 The Church of Hope is an American Baptist Church serving
the population of the South Dakota Women’s Prison at Pierre.164
The Anchor Prison Ministry was founded by a former stateemployee prison chaplain after South Dakota evolved to a volunteer

158. Press Release, South Dakota Department of Corrections, Volunteers, staff members
receive honors from Department of Corrections (May 27, 2004), https://doc.sd.gov/documents/news/2004/2004-5-27DOCAwards.pdf (“Pastor Bradley is the pastor of the Church of
Hope, an inmate congregation at the South Dakota Women’s Prison in Pierre. She conducts
church services and bible study groups, counsels inmates and helps maintain the inmate library.
She began her volunteer work with the female inmates before the Women’s Prison opened in
1997.”).
159. Id. (“Father Ashfield has served as the Catholic priest at the Penitentiary and Jameson Annex since 1997. He has provided many activities for the Catholic inmates including
Mass, bible study, Catholic Inquiry and Stations of the Cross during Lent. He also is the coordinator of the Residents Encounter Christ program, which is held three times a year.”).
160. Id. (“Pastor Christenson began serving the Saint Dysmas Church at the Penitentiary
in 2000. He leads bible study, has organized a choir, leads weekly church services for inmates
and has implemented Easter sunrise services and Candlelight services at Christmas. He also
played a significant role in the re-furbishing of the Penitentiary chapel.”).
161. Id. (“Beauchamp is the volunteer chaplain for the Prison Lighthouse Fellowship, an
inmate congregation associated with the General Baptist Conference at the Jameson Annex of
the Penitentiary. He has worked with DOC since 1991. Beauchamp maintains the chapel library at Jameson, leads bible study groups and a choir and also teaches guitar lessons to inmates. He also coordinates the Prison Fellowship program that meets twice a year at the penitentiary.”).
162. Id. (“Montoya has volunteered her time to work with inmates at the Penitentiary for
the past 15 years. She assists Native American inmates arrange Pow Wows, spiritual conferences and visits with medicine men and spiritual advisors. Montoya also works with the Family
Connection, which provides a place for inmate family members to stay when they come to
Sioux Falls.”).
163. ST. DYSMAS OF SOUTH DAKOTA, http://www.stdysmas.com (last visited Jan. 29,
2020).
164. CHURCH OF HOPE, https://www.churchofhopepierre.org/about (last visited Jan. 29,
2020).
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model.165 The Cornerstone Prison Church is a Christian Reformed
congregation at the men’s penitentiary at Sioux Falls.166 The Living
Stone Prison Church is a congregation at the prison in Yankton.167
The Asatru religious group at the penitentiary practices an ancient
pagan religion.168 South Dakota also has a group for Humanist inmates.169
Of course, the South Dakota system faces the challenges inherent
in a voluntary model. For example, in the summer of 2018, the Native American inmates at the penitentiary at Sioux Falls ran low on
firewood for their sweat lodge purification ceremonies.170 It takes
about a half-pickup truck load for each two-hour ceremony; the penitentiary regularly would schedule six sweat lodge ceremonies each
week.171 The group relies on contributions from the City of Sioux
Falls and members of the community for the necessary firewood.172
The South Dakota Department of Corrections has for a number of
years allowed for the establishment of “Inmate Sweat Lodge Accounts” to facilitate private donations to support the operations of
165. The history of the Anchor Prison Ministry involves both the state-employee and
volunteer models of prison pastoral services: “Since 1991, Regan and Becky Beauchamp have
ministered together behind the walls of the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls,
S.D. Regan serves as chaplain and Becky assists by playing the piano for worship services and
serves as his administrative assistant. During the first four years of prison chaplaincy, Regan was
employed by the State. In August 1995 the Governor cut funding because of a lawsuit filed by
an inmate group of Wiccans (neopagans). Since September 1995 Regan and Becky have raised
their own support to continue ministry.” Anchor Prison Ministry, LOCAL PRAYERS,
https://www.localprayers.com/US/Sioux-Falls/1616660305264070/Anchor-Prison-Ministry.
166. CORNERSTONE PRISON CHURCH, https://www.cornerstonepcsd.org (last visited
Jan. 29, 2020).
167. LIVING STONE PRISON CHURCH, https://livingstoneprisonchurch.com (last visited
Jan. 29, 2020).
168. Joe Alquist, Pagan Worship Group Scrutinized in South Dakota Prison, CAP. J.
(May 17, 2017), https://www.capjournal.com/news/pagan-worship-group-scrutinized-in-southdakota-prison/article_4b20a2d6-3ea8-11e7-9ad0-d736ce3ac8dd.html.
169. See South Dakota Prison Gets Freethought Books, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION:
FREETHOUGHT TODAY (Oct. 2017), https://ffrf.org/publications/freethought-today/item/
30892-south-dakota-prison-gets-freethought-books; Secular Groups Demand Equal Treatment
for Humanist Prisoners, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND (Feb. 27, 2018) https://ffrf.org/
news/news-releases/item/31840-secular-groups-demand-equal-treatment-for-humanistprisoners.
170. Danielle Ferguson, Wood Shortage Could Threaten South Dakota Prison Sweat
Lodge Ceremonies, SIOUX FALLS ARGUS LEADER (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.argusleader
.com/story/news/2018/08/28/south-dakota-state-penitentiary-inmates-wood-shortage-couldthreaten-sweat-lodge-ceremonies/1078491002/.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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sweat lodges at their prison facilities.173 But apparently the inmates
rely on donations of firewood.174 Because of slow firewood donations
in the summer of 2018, the sweat lodge ceremonies were not held for
several weeks. The prison official responsible for coordinating religious activities noted the challenge:
Cultural Activities Program Manager Tammy Mertens-Jones
says the sweat lodge ceremonies help reduce tension. When there
isn’t enough wood, some inmates participate in a pipe ceremony instead. But Montoya compared that to saying the rosary instead of
going to a full church service.175

In this situation, the voluntary system in South Dakota worked.
The day after a newspaper story ran about the shortage of firewood
for the sweat lodge ceremonies at the prison, South Dakotans called
the prison with offers to donate wood.176 As of the fall of 2019, volunteers have continued to donate ample supplies of wood for the sweat
lodge.177
Neither does the volunteer model completely eliminate inmate
litigation. For example, the South Dakota Department of Corrections was sued by inmates over a revision to the tobacco use policy.178
Native American inmates unsuccessfully claimed that a reduction of
the tobacco proportion in the tobacco and red willow bark mixture

173. See Policy 1.1.A.10: Inmate Sweat Lodge Accounts, S.D. DEP’T OF CORR. (Feb. 27,
2019), https://doc.sd.gov/documents/Inmate%20Sweat%20Lodge%20Accounts3222019.pdf.
174. Anthony Wright, Wood Shortage Hampers State Prison Sweat Lodge Ceremonies,
KSOO (Aug. 29, 2018), https://ksoo.com/wood-shortage-hampers-state-prison-sweat-lodgeceremonies/.
175. Id.
176. E-mail from Danielle Ferguson, Sioux Falls Argus Leader, to Allan W. Vestal, Professor of Law, Drake University Law School (September 13, 2019, 10:57 CDT) (on file with
author). Ms. Ferguson reported that the day after her article ran she received a note from a cultural volunteer at the penitentiary: “A load of wood is being delivered right now thanks to your
article! I think we have received 6 phone calls this morning with offers of wood.”
177. Id. Ms. Ferguson reported that she spoke with one of the inmates involved in the
sweat lodge “a few weeks after that story ran, and then again a few months later . . . and both
times he said they had received a good supply of wood and hadn't had to worry about it.” Ms.
Ferguson also noted that a volunteer at the prison who has been involved in the wood supply
for the sweat lodge “said they are still in good shape as of [mid-September, 2019]. They have a
pile of wood waiting to be cut.”
178. Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2014).
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allowed for their religious ceremonies substantially burdened their
free exercise rights.179
It appears that South Dakota provides a thoughtful, wellmanaged, and responsive volunteer program to facilitate its inmates’
free-exercise rights without violating the compulsion and preference
guarantees of its constitution. It could be a model for other states.

sfffK == ` lk`irpflk =
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Reverend W.C.
Gunn, a Baptist clergyman, was a state-employee “Chaplain and
Teacher” at the Iowa State Penitentiary in Fort Madison.180 In 1879,
Reverend Gunn wrote a report to the warden of the prison in which
he characterized his work as that of a minister: “In my labors here I
have done just as I would do were I to take charge of a parish.”181
Thus, the employment of Reverend Gunn by the State of Iowa violated that state constitution’s compulsion guarantee.
One of the successes upon which Reverend Gunn reported was
the prison’s Sunday school program. Reverend Gunn used Joseph M.
Beck, a lay volunteer from Fort Madison, to oversee the Sunday
school program at the prison.182 Because Beck was a volunteer and
not a state employee, the Sunday school program comported with the
state constitution. It was fortuitous that the Sunday school program
comported with the state constitution, because in addition to volunteering as head of the prison’s Sunday school program, Beck was the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Iowa.183
In determining whether it violates the constitutions of the
Northwest Territory states for them to have state-employee prison
179.
180.

See id.

Chaplain’s Report (Oct. 1, 1879), 4 IOWA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE EIGHTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
IOWA 53 (1880). Reverend Gunn signed the report to the Legislature as: “W.C. Gunn, Chaplain and Teacher.” Id. at 57. Editorial, Church Leader is Dead, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, April 16,
1937, https://content.libraries.wsu.edu/digital/collection/p16866coll10/id/1335/rec/1. Reverend Gunn served as the warden of the penitentiary from 1883 to 1885. Beulah White Walker,
History and Development of Fort Madison Penitentiary, 1839-1933 (June 1934) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Iowa) (on file with University of Iowa).
181. Chaplain’s Report, supra note 180 at 53.
182. Id. at 54.
183. Id. Of course, not every aspect of the prison religious program evidenced constitutional sensitivity. Revered Gunn proudly reported that “The rules of the prison require that a
copy of the Holy Scriptures be placed in every cell.” Id. at 54.
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chaplains, it is helpful to be clear about what is at issue and what is
not. Whether prison chaplains provide valuable pastoral services to
inmates is not the question. I am perfectly willing to stipulate that
some prisoners in some situations benefit from having access to pastoral services provided by prison chaplains.
Nor is the question at issue whether prison inmates have a free
exercise right to pastoral services. Subject to reasonable institutional
security concerns, inmates have a right to access pastoral services. Of
course, it should be noted that inmates have that right to access prison chaplains precisely because the chaplains provide religious services
that implicate the free-exercise rights of the inmates under the federal and state constitutions. That inmates have a free-exercise right to
the services of prison chaplains confirms that the prison chaplains are
indeed ministers.
What is at issue here is whether taxpayers should be required to
subsidize religious sects by paying for access to such pastoral services
with public funds.
In the end, whether the practice of having state-employee prison
chaplains comports with state constitution compulsion and preference guarantees is not a difficult judgment if approached in good
faith. The compulsion guarantees prohibit the states from collecting
taxes to fund ministers. Prison chaplains are ministers. Ergo, the
practice is unconstitutional. The preference guarantees prohibit the
states from preferring one belief system on matters of religion over
another. Either by explicitly excluding certain disfavored religions
from participating in the state subsidies inherent in the system of
state-employee prison chaplains, or by favoring some religions over
others in allocating the subsidies, the practice of having stateemployee prison chaplains violates the preference guarantees. Again,
the practice is unconstitutional.184
It violates the compulsion and preference guarantees of the
Northwest Territory states to have state-employee prison chaplains.
We should follow the path advocated by Iowa Supreme Court Justice
Harvey Uhlenhopp in his Rudd dissent: “Why not assume that the

184. The Blaine Amendments present a third possible challenge to the practice of having
state-employee prison chaplains, but this judgment is dependent on the precise wording of the
clauses.
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framers of the constitution, and the people who voted it into existence, meant exactly what it says?”185

185. Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 136 (Iowa 1976) (Uhlenhopp, J., dissenting) (quoting Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889)).
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